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Abstract 
Dedebit Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) has been facing increase in loan default rate from time to time on 
group owned MSEs for the past five years. Thus, the aim of this study was to  identify  and  analyze  the factors 
that  influence  group  loan repayment performance of the clients of DECSI operating  in  the service sector  as  
group  owned  MSEs.  This study applied descriptive and explanatory research approach, cross-sectional primary 
data, stratified sampling techniques, and finally employed binary logistic regression model to identify and 
analyze the impact of each independent variable on the loan repayment performance. A total of eleven 
explanatory variables were included in the binary logit regression model test. The binary logistic regression 
result revealed that among the variables  hypothesized  to  affect  loan  repayment social ties,  business 
experience,  group formation (screening), internal rule and regulation, saving, suitable loan  repayment period 
(loan term), and supervision have statistically significant effect on loan repayment of the  group borrowers. 
Therefore, among others, DECSI should encourage self-screened group borrowers; enhance saving programs, 
and revise loan term by considering the time required for the service sector to generate income, and regular 
supervision for borrowers should be in place to increase loan repayment performance of the clients.  
Keywords: Binary Logit, DECSI, Determinant, Ethiopia, Group Loan, Mekelle, MFIs, MSEs, Service Sector. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most microfinance institutions provide collateral-free small loans to low income households. These loans are 
generally expected to use for self-employment and income generating activities (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). 
Microfinance can be a critical element of an effective poverty reduction strategy (Wolday, 2000).  
Microfinance institution has grown in prominence since Mohammad Yunus started the Grameen Bank 
project in 1976. The Grameen bank of Bangladesh, which was founded by Mohammed Yunus, was one of the 
first microfinance institutions (MFIs). Mohammad Yunus came up on a group of villagers that were unable to 
pay off their debt to money lenders. He found that he was able to lend them what they needed out of pocket. He 
started lending services that avoid high interest rate that the traditional money lenders charged (Cabraal, 2006).  
The development of microfinance institutions in Ethiopia is a recent phenomenon. The proclamation, 
which provides for the establishment of microfinance institutions, was issued in July 1996.  Since  then,  various  
microfinance institutions  have  legally been  registered  and  started delivering microfinance  services  (Wolday, 
2000).  
DECSI evolved from a program established by the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a local NGO 
founded in 1978. In 1993, REST conducted a socio-economic study on rural poverty in Tigray that indicated an 
unmet demand for finance by the rural poor. Based on this study, the Rural Credit Scheme in Tigray (RCST) was 
established under REST. Dedebit Credit and Savings Institution (DECSI) was established and registered in 1997 
as a microfinance institution (MFI) providing credit and savings services for the rural and urban poor in the 
Tigray region of Ethiopia. It is one of the most famous MFIs in Ethiopia (Temesgen, 2014). 
There are eleven types of loan (products) in DECSI. The size and loan period varies depending on the 
type of loan. Loan is provided either in group guarantee, individual with third party guarantee or through 
collateral. The Major types of DECSI’s loan are regular loan, agricultural loan, civil servant loan, rural package 
(household centered) loan, urban package loan, business loan, housing loan, loan for graduates of technical and 
vocational education training, loan for university and college graduates, equipment leasing and cooperatives. 
There are many Micro and Small Enterprises in Tigray (MSEs). The most common MSEs financed by DECSI 
are manufacturing, services and agriculture (Temesgen, 2014).  
An extensive  effort  to  reduce  unemployment  in  the  city  of  Mekelle  is  going  on  by  the 
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government through organizing those unemployed communities by assuming it is not an option rather it is very 
essential. Government is taking major role on how those organized peoples can access to loan from Dedebit 
Credit and Saving Institution (DECSI) microfinance institution.  
Microfinance plays vital role in poverty reduction in developing countries. Loans taken from lending 
institutions vary from country to country, region to region and sector to sector. But most of MFIs in developing 
countries share the one common characteristic that is suffer from a considerable default rate (Kashuliza, 1993).  
Due to this reason, a study is needed in order to identify the determinant factors of group loan repayment 
performance. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Microfinance is defined as the attempt to improve access to small deposits and small loans for poor households 
neglected by banks or is defined as the provision of financial services to the poor involving small deposits and 
loans and use peer monitoring and joint liability structure to overcome the screening, monitoring and 
enforcement problems commonly encountered by formal lending institutions (Schreiner & Colombet, 2001).  
Microfinance  can  be also defined  as  financial  instruments,  such  as  loans,  savings,  insurance  and  
other financial products that are tailored only to the poor. Microfinance is created in the economy for the 
economic benefit of the poor and to alleviate poverty. Microcredit is the lending side of microfinance. 
Microcredit  loans  help  the  poor  to  be  involved  in  income  generating  activities  that  allow  them  to 
accumulate capital and improve their standard of living (Hanim, Gilbert, & Gan, 2007). 
Since 1970s, group lending programs have been promoted in many developing countries. The key 
feature of group lending is joint liability. This means all group members are treated as being in default if any one 
member of the group does not repay his/her loan. Therefore, each member is made responsible for repayment of 
loans of his or her peers (Besley & Coate, 1995). Most schemes give subsequent credit only if the group has 
fully repaid its previous loan. Loan under joint liability shows the threat of losing access to future credit incites 
members to perform various functions, including screening of loan applicants, monitoring the individual 
borrower’s efforts, and enforcing repayment of their peers’ loans (Zeller, 1996).  
In analyzing Joint Liability Lending Institutions (JLLIs), economists have agreed that joint liability 
alleviates the four main problems (i.e., adverse selection, moral hazard, costly audits and enforcement) faced by 
formal credit institutions that lend to poor borrowers who cannot offer much in the way of collateral (Ghatak & 
Guinnane, 1999).  
 
2.1. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON LOAN REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE IN ETHIOPIA 
Retta (2000) has examined loan repayment performance of group borrowers in Addis Ababa. His finding was 
frequency of loan, supervision, suitability of repayment period and other income sources are found to encourage 
repayment hence reduce the probability of loan default.  
Abreham (2002) carried a study on the loan repayment and its determinants in small-scale enterprise 
financing in Ethiopia around Zeway area. His finding was education and work experience related economic 
activities before the loan are enhancing loan repayment. While extended loan repayment period influence the 
repayment performance negatively. In terms of gender composition 12.7% are females while the rest 87.3% are 
male borrowers. The mean loan-rationing ratio is larger for males while the mean loan recovery rate is less than 
female borrowers. The proportion of defaulters is 61.5% for females and 69.7% for males. Female borrowers are 
better payers relative to males. This supports the hypothesis that females feel more responsibility for their family 
than males. 
Jemal (2003) analyzed the microfinance repayment performance of Oromia Credit and Saving 
Institution (OCSI) in Kuyu, Ethiopia. According to his finding, gender, loan size and number of dependants are 
negatively related to loan repayment. On the other hand, age was found to be positive. Income from activities 
financed by loan, repayment period suitability and loan supervision are positively and significantly related to 
loan repayment performance. Moreover, loan diversion is significant and negatively related to loan repayment 
rate. The negative sign implies that the use of diverted funds for non-income generating purposes. 
Berhanu (2005) studied the determinants of loan repayment performance of smallholder farmers in 
North Gondar, Ethiopia. His finding revealed that experience and numbers of contacts were found to 
significantly influence the repayment performance. But, loan amount was found to have insignificant effect on 
loan repayment performance.  
Fikirte (2011) conducted a study on the determinants of loan repayment performance in Addis Credit 
and Saving Institution (ACSI). She found that age has significant positive effect on the loan repayment 
performance which means as age increased; the probability of being defaulter is decreased. This implies that the 
borrowers are more aware on financial management and they feel responsibility as they get elder but education 
and business experiences had no significant effect on the probability of being defaulter. In the group lending 
female borrowers have performed worse loan repayment performance than male. Moreover, the percentage of 
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female defaulters was higher than non-defaulter. 
Zelalem, Hassen, and Jema (2013) studied the determinants of loan repayment performance 
considering 14 explanatory variables. Among these, business experience was found to significantly influence the 
probability of being non-defaulter. The remaining variables like age, loan size and educational level were found 
to have no significant effect on the loan recovery rate. 
Million, Nyikal, and Wania (2012) conducted a study on the factors affecting loan repayment 
performance. They found that education is an important determinant of loan repayment. An educated client  is 
able to use modern technologies,  perform  farming  activities  based  on  cropping  calendar,  and  manage  
resources  properly.  All these factors boost production, which improves loan repayment.  
To summarize, training, repayment period experience and loan size are found to have positive impact 
on repayment performance, but some studies commented that repayment period and loan size have negative 
effect on the repayment rate, and other studies contended that loan size and experience have no significant effect 
on loan repayment performance. These show that the empirical evidences portrayed differences in their findings. 
 
2.2. EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON LOAN REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Godquin (2004) tested the explanatory power of models that attribute the performances of MFIs in terms of 
repayment rate to the use of group lending, social intermediation and dynamic incentives. Age, loan size, and 
duration showed a significant negative impact on the repayment rate but social ties and professional training of 
the borrower have expected positive impact on the repayment performance. According to the theory of dynamic 
incentives, repayment performance increased as loan size increases. The size of the loan showed expected 
negative sign and is significant in the specifications as in the study by Sharma and Zeller (1997). This negative 
sign is theoretically explained by the fact that the loan size increases the gain associated with ex-ante and ex-post 
moral hazard. The negative sign of the loan size of the loan could also be linked to the borrower’s difficulty in 
repaying a larger amount over a given period (usually one year). It could be that, for a given duration, large loans 
do not meet the borrower’s needs and are not suited to the local economy. This statement is related to the 
positive and significant sign of the duration of the loan throughout the specifications. Social ties inside the group 
had a significant and unexpected negative impact on the repayment rate. The coefficient of the age of the 
borrowing group at the due date has a positive and significant coefficient but female borrowers did not prove to 
have a significantly better repayment performance. Even though the coefficient is positive, it is not significant. It 
is indeed expected that the social ties and other benefits of the group, such as information-sharing, increase with 
the age of the group. As previously mentioned, however, the age of the group has a negative impact on 
repayment performance. If MFIs want to allocate larger loans to group members with whom they have an 
established relationship, they should also develop specific incentives for their experienced borrowers to have a 
better repayment performance. 
Natukunda (2010) described micro finance credit lending terms and repayment performance and stated 
the  loan  sizes  in  most  cases  affect  the  nature  of  business  and  type  of  investment  for  the borrowers. The 
small loan size is often advanced by the micro finance institutions as a way of minimizing risks.  However,  
when  the clients  are  not  given  adequate  funds  to cater  for  their business needs, they tend to   resort to 
multiple borrowing. This in turn affects their repayment and increases the risks of the loan. The respondents 
were divided as to whether Brac Uganda is giving them enough credit to cater for their business needs with some 
indicating that it was enough while others indicated that it was not. This is in line with the findings by George 
(2008) who indicated that sometimes the loans issued by MFIs are too small to make an impact on women’s 
businesses. The perception of the respondents as to whether the loan period given by Brac Uganda is appropriate 
to their business needs indicated that members were satisfied with the loan period of five months. This concurs 
with Woolcock (2008), who argued that a long loan period may make the client to be extravagant and end up 
failing to pay back the loan. Clients taking small loans should not be given very long repayment period. From the 
research findings since the majority of the clients were dealing in small businesses and taking small loans, they 
need a short loan period for regular recapitalization. 
Zeller (1996) analyzed the determinants of repayment performance of credit groups in Madagascar.  
His finding is groups with higher level of social cohesion have a better repayment rate. Moreover, the programs 
that provide saving service to their members have a significantly higher repayment rate. This result emphasizes 
the role of saving services for improving the performance of group credit programs. He also identified that with 
larger group size, the repayment performance improves.  This result is in line with the hypothesized economies 
of scale, scope, and risk.  However, it is to be noted that groups will have increasing costs of coordination, moral 
hazard, and free-rider problems when group size surpasses manageable levels.  The optimal group size will vary 
with respect to socioeconomic and agro ecological conditions of the participating communities and with program 
characteristics. 
Zeller (1996) assessed repayment performance in group-based credit programs in Bangladesh. Their 
hypothesis was that the bigger the group, the more imperfect are flows of information likely to be between 
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members. Hence, problems arising out of asymmetric information make monitoring and enforcing costly and 
less effective.  Rates of default are therefore expected to increase with group size (+). The sign of the coefficient 
is positive as expected; however, it is marginally insignificant at the 10-percent level. They found that the greater 
the loan size, the greater the probability of the default (+). 
As per empirical analysis on determinants of repayment performance in credit groups by Zeller (1998) 
implementation of internal rules and regulations by the group members would lead to the better  repayment  
performance  that  is  decrement  in  the  cost  of  operations  of  the  lender  and decrement in the default rate. 
 Olagunju and Adeyemo (2007) have analyzed the determinants of repayment decision among small 
holder farmers in Southwestern State of Nigeria. The result showed that the number of visits made by loan 
officers to the borrowers, higher level of education, and time of loan disbursement would have a better 
repayment performance. Moreover, borrowers with lower number of household members would meet their 
repayment obligation better than those with high number of household members. And having access to business 
related information and providing training to the clients are increasing the loan repayment rate of the borrowers.  
Woolcock (2008) observed that if the loan term is too short, the borrower fails to generate revenue to  
enable  him/her  make  repayments  while  a  longer  loan  term  may  make  the  client  extravagant  and  the 
client  may  in  the  end  fail  to  pay  back.  For successful results, the loan terms should match the cash patterns 
to help the client budget cash flows. He  also argued  that  if physical  collateral  were  a  requirement  for  
borrowing,  most  MFIs  clientele  would  be  unable  to participate due to their extreme poverty levels. Since 
borrowers do not have physical collateral, MFIs focus on using social collateral via group lending.  Group 
lending encompasses a variety of methodologies, but all are based on the principle of joint liability.  In essence, 
the group  takes  over  the  underwriting,  monitoring,  and  enforcement  of  loan  contracts  from  the  lending 
institution. 
Goldmark (2001) indicated that under  joint  liability  each  group  member  is  made  responsible  for  
the loan of other group members. If one defaults, the other group members are required to cover the loan from  
their  own  resources,  and  if  they  do  not,  they  lose  access  to  future  loans.  It is thus in each member’s 
interest to ensure that the other members pay.   
George (2008) argued that a large majority of the micro finance institutions were offering very short 
loan repayment periods without grace periods, thus straining and pressuring them to make quick repayments. 
The clients did not feel the immediate impact of the loan but instead they felt immense pressure to put all their 
earnings towards loan repayment. He further indicated that the immense pressure associated with quick loan 
repayment and short grace period could have led some micro entrepreneurs to sell their land in order to meet the 
demand for quick repayments. 
Hanim et al.(2007) reported that the probability of a loan repayment problem was higher for borrowers 
who repaid their loans on a weekly basis. As hypothesized, a weekly loan repayment schedule posed problems 
for borrowers who generated a lower revenue cycle. They have also revealed that age was positive and 
significant. Borrowers in the 46 to 55 age group had a higher probability of having repayment problems. This 
finding contradicted with the hypothesis that older borrowers were more responsible in repaying their loans than 
younger borrowers. This could be because the borrowers in this age group might have higher financial 
commitments to their family and business expenses. Thus, with higher financial obligations, they could have 
difficulty in repaying their loans. Borrowers aged between 18 and 25 years old had a higher probability of having 
a problem in repaying their loans.  The  age  group  18  to  25  years  old  is  the  youngest  group  among 
borrowers.  This finding supports the argument that older borrowers would be more responsible and disciplined 
in repaying their loans than younger borrowers. Lack of experience in the business involved, which resulted in 
less income received, might be the reason that the younger group has difficulty in repaying the loan. In addition, 
younger borrowers are not committed to repaying their loan because they might believe that  even  if  they  
default;  they  still  can  receive  microcredit  loans  from  other  microfinance  institutions because  they have 
more opportunities  since  they  are  still  young. They found that significant positive sign on the gender variable 
indicated that the probability of a loan repayment problem was higher for males than for females. 
Onyeagocha and Chidebelu (2012) carried a study on determinant of loan repayment performance in 
Southeast State of Nigeria.  They hypothesized that loan size to have a negative relationship with repayment rate. 
In other words, the higher the loan size given by the institution, the lower was the repayment rate of the clients. 
Their regression result strongly disagreed with this hypothesis. It stipulated that the higher the size of the loan to 
clients, the higher the repayment rate.  This  situation  appears  to  be  most  unlikely  because  the amount  to  be  
repaid  was  relatively  larger  and  if  the  loan  was from development oriented institution with subsidized 
interest rate  and  little  chance  of  repeat  loans,  the  pressure  or inclination  of  such  clients  would  be  to  
delay  repayment.  
Sylvester, Okpara, and Chukwudi (2013) assessed the determinants of loan repayment performance. 
The coefficient of age of clients was significant at 1% but negatively signed indicating that age has an inverse 
relationship with repayment rate. This may be as they get old, in that they take less risk and invest less but think 
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or concentrate more on their daily consumption activities without thinking of collecting loans. Experience 
coefficient is also significant at 1% and positively signed. This means that a client with higher business 
experience stands a better chance of repaying more loan than with those of lower business experience. The 
reason for this may be attributed to improvement in managerial skill  which  makes  for  higher  profitability  
which  in  turn induces the  need for more financial resources to further enhance profitability. The educational 
level coefficient had a positive sign indicating that education has direct relationship to the repayment rate and 
this showed that as level of education increases, borrowers enhances their  ability to access, evaluate, and 
understand new production  techniques. This  underpins  the  assertion  that  educated farmers are  more 
amenable  to  risk  taking  and  change than  the  non-educated  ones.  The result of this study showed that the 
higher the literacy level of the clients, the higher will likely be non-default. 
To sum up, the empirical evidences showed that there are many factors that affect the group loan 
repayment performance positively or negatively. In most studies described that loan size, loan term, training, 
social ties, saving, experiences, peer monitoring, supervision, internal rules and regulation and group formation 
(screening) are found to positively affect group loan repayment performance; group size is found affecting 
negatively the group loan repayment performance; however, in some studies loan size  found to have negative 
impact on the repayment performance and in some other studies loan size and experiences are found to have no 
significant effect on group loan repayment performance. This shows the empirical evidences revealed that the 
impact of the factors on the loan repayment performance differs in terms of the group characteristic related 
factors, economic and institutional factors. 
 
2.3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 1 below demonstrates the conceptual framework of the relationship between the dependent variable 
(group loan repayment performance) and the independent variables (those factors that determine loan repayment 
performance) mentioned above. 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
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3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Although the performance of the MFIs in Ethiopia has been impressive since their establishment, they are not 
free of default problems as can be observed in the following table. Hunte (1996) argued  that  default  problems  
destroy  lending  capacity  as  the  flow of repayment declines, transforming lenders into welfare  agencies,  
instead  of a viable  financial  institution. Loan default may also deny new applicants access to credit as the 
microfinance institutions management problems augment in direct proportion to the increasing default problem.  
One indicator of effective MFIs is the loan performance of the borrowers (Sengupta & Aubuchin, 2008). High 
repayment rates are associated with the benefits for both MFIs and borrowers (Godquin, 2004). If there is high 
repayment rate, the relationship between the MFIs and their clients will be good (Bond & Rai, 2009). In contrast, 
if there is low repayment rate, both the borrowers and MFIs will be adversely affected. So if the MFIs are not 
viable because of default problem, borrowers will not have access to loan and suffer from poverty, as a result 
affects the development of the country as whole.  
Figure 2 below indicated that average default rate of the borrowers for the last five years is about 16% 
which is greater than the Ethiopian National Bank (NBE) minimum requirement set  for  all  financial  
institutions,  i.e.,  <5  percent  (or  >95 percent expected to be collected). In 2009 the default rate was 18.47% 
and increased to 25% in year of 2010. Though the default rate was decreasing to 9.8% and 4% in the years of 
2011 and 2012, respectively, finally it increases to 24% in the year of 2013.  
Besides, the repayment performances of the group borrowers have been significantly fluctuating from 
time to time. Thus, whether  default  is  random  and  influenced  by  erratic  behavior  or  whether it is 
influenced by certain factors in a specific situation, needs an empirical investigation.  
Figure 2. Default Rate in the Past Five Successive Years 
Source: DECSI (2014) 
 
4. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The main objective of this study was to investigate and examine the determinant factors that influence group 
loan repayment performance of MSEs service sector in Mekelle City. More specifically, the research has the 
following objectives:   
 To identify the major determinant factors that influences the group loan repayment performance in 
DECSI. 
 To examine the magnitude or marginal effect of each determinant factors on group loan repayment 
performance. 
 
5. MATERIALS AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section deals with an overview of the study area and research methodology. Specifically it presents 
selection of the research methods that are used in this study: research approach; data type, source and collection 
techniques; sampling techniques; data analysis techniques, i.e., the operational definition of variables and 
specific model that is applied to test the literature driven hypotheses followed by the required model 
specification and tests.   
 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
18.47%
25%
9.80%
4%
24%
Loan Default Rate in Percentage
Default rate
year
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5.1. DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA 
The study area is Mekelle city which is located at northern part of Ethiopia, in Tigray regional state. It is located 
at a distance of 783 kilometers from the capital city of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa. Mekelle is the capital city of 
Tigray regional state. It is located at latitude and longitude of 13
o
 29’N, 39
O
 28’E, respectively, with an elevation 
of 2084meters above sea level. It is a city with seven sub city administrations. Based on the study conducted in 
2010 by Mekelle municipality, the city had an estimated total population of 248,566; of which 120,830 were 
males and 127,736 were females [Mekelle City Administration (MCA), 2010]. 
DECSI is located in Mekelle city, the capital city of Tigray. When the institution commenced in 1994, 
it had branches in 8 Wereda of the region with only 31 employees. Today, it provides services from 165 
functionally decentralized offices all over Tigray regional state as well as Addis Ababa and Gondar. The current 
number of the staff has reached 2,727. The institution delivers major types of loan like regular loan, agricultural 
input loam, civil servant loan, rural package loan, urban package loan, business loan, housing loan, and 
cooperative loan. In general, the institution operates in rural and urban Tigray catering the poorest of the poor 
segment of the community as farmers, youth, marginalized women, disabled veterans, TVETs, graduated 
students, contractors, Micro-Small Enterprises and agro-industries. Up to now, more than 8 billion Birr loan is 
disbursed to 3,104,769 clients, out of which 25 million loans is disbursed to 512 cooperative clients (Temesgen, 
2014). 
 
5.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
5.2.1. RESEARCH APPROACH  
For a similar study, Million et al.(2012) have applied descriptive approach; Paxton (1996) has applied 
explanatory approach; and Fikirte (2011), Jemal (2003), and Natukunda (2010) have applied both descriptive 
and explanatory approach. Besides, all the above researchers used a cross-sectional data. Thus, this study used a 
cross-sectional data, and applied descriptive approach to describe qualitative data collected through unstructured 
interview and explanatory approach to analyze the factors that determine loan repayment performance. 
5.2.2. DATA TYPE, SOURCES, AND COLLECTION TECHNIQUE 
Fikirte (2011) and Natukunda (2010) used primary data composed of qualitative and quantitative data collected 
through questionnaire and secondary data; and Jemal (2003) and George (2008) used primary data only 
composed of qualitative and quantitative data collected through questionnaire and interview. Therefore, in order 
to assess the determinants of group loan repayment performance, this study used primary data comprising 
qualitative and quantitative data obtained by unstructured interview from four management team and six loan 
officers of DECSI and by structured questionnaire from DECSI clients.   
5.2.3. SAMPLE DESIGN 
For a similar study, Fikirte (2011) and Natukunda (2010) used a stratified sampling technique to select sample 
respondents; Jemal (2003) and Godquin (2004) used simple random sampling, and George (2008) used 
multistage sampling method to select sample respondents.  
Currently DECSI Mekelle branch has three sub-branches (loan centers) but the study focused on the two sub-
branch (service delivery centers) selected based on default rate of the loan centers. The target populations of the 
two loan centers were 7 group loaners engaged in service sector consisting of 122 group members. A simplified 
formula (Yamane, 1967) was applied to determine the sample size at 90% level of significance.  
n


--------------------------------------------- (1) 
Where N = population size; e = the level of precision. 
The sample size was: 
                                 n

	.
 = n

.
 = 55. 
Therefore, the study used stratified proportionate random sampling to select the 55 sample respondents from the 
two loan centers.  
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TABLE 1. DETERMINATION OF PROPORTIONATE SAMPLE SIZE 
(a) 
Sub-branch 
(b) 
Activities 
(c) 
Population in a group 
(d) =	
∗

 
Sample size 
 
 
North 
Janitor  65 29 
Car wash 10 4 
Café 4 2 
Service 18 8 
 
South 
Recreation 10 4 
Restaurant 9 4 
Internet 10 4 
                                             Total 122 55 
Source: DECSI’s North and South Branch office Report (2014) 
The sample size accounts for about 45% of the population and this implies the sample respondents 
represent the target population. 
5.2.4. METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS  
For a similar study, Fikirte (2011) used descriptive statistics such as mean, percentage, standard deviation and 
frequency distribution in order to analyze the qualitative data; and the logistic regression model to analyze the 
effect and magnitude of each explanatory variable on the dependent variable.  Natukunda (2010) and Paxton 
(1996) also used descriptive statistics like minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, frequency, and 
percentage for analyzing qualitative data; and logistic regression model to identify the effect and relationship of 
explanatory variables with that of dependent variable. Therefore, this study described the qualitative data 
collected through unstructured interview and applied the logit regression model for analyzing the relationship 
and effect of the explanatory variables on the loan repayment performance. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Loan repayment performance is a non-continuous dependent variable. In this case the value of dependent 
variable is 0 and 1, where 1 stands if borrower is a non-defaulter and 0 if the borrower is defaulter. For this kind 
of binary nature dependent variable, logistic or probit regression model is suitable (Gujirati, 2004; Verbeehk, 
2008). Fikirte (2011) employed logit regression model and Jemal (2003) and Paxton (1996) have employed 
probit regression model to analyze their study. Therefore, this study used logistic regression model for its 
mathematical simplicity. Mathematical function of the model is: 
Y (i) = α+ ∑+µi--------------------------------------- (2) 
Where,  
 Yi = loan repayment performance (0, 1) is dependent variable where 1 stands for non-defaulter and 0 
defaulter. 
 α = constant (intercept) 
 Xi = independent variables (gender, age, educational level, experience, social ties, saving loan size 
group size credit period and                               training).  
  βi = parameters to be estimated and µi = disturbance term (Million et al.,  2012). 
 
MODEL TEST 
Before running the logit model, explanatory variables should be checked for existence of multicollinearity 
heteroskedasticity and misspecification problems. The existence of such problems were tested by using Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) used to diagnose the multicollinearity (i.e., violation of classical assumption that states 
no independent variable is a perfect linear function of one or more other independent variables); ovtest used to 
diagnose the existence of omitted variable; hettest used to diagnose the violation of homoskedasticity classical 
assumption; and link test used to diagnose model specification (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 1980). 
VIF shows how the variance of an estimator is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity. That is, as 
the extent of co linearity increases, the variance of an estimator increases, and in the limit it can become infinite. 
If there is no collinearity between two or more independent variables, VIF will be 1. The larger the value of VIF, 
the more troublesome or collinear the variables each other or one another. As a rule of thumb, if the VIF of a 
variable exceeds 10, which will happen if R
2 
exceeds 0.90, that variable is said to be highly collinear (Gujirati, 
2004). 
Hettest is statistical tool to detect heteroskedasticity problem. If the p–value of hettest result is greater 
than 0.05 (i.e., p>0.05), it does not show strong heteroskedasticity problem (Stock & Watson, 2007).  
The link test command performs a model specification link test for single-equation models. Link test is 
based on the idea that if a regression is properly specified, one should not be able to find any additional 
independent variables that are significant. Link test creates two new variables, the variable of prediction, _hat, 
and the variable of squared prediction, _hatsq. The model is then refitting using these two variables as predictors. 
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_Hat is the predicted value hence; _hatsq shouldn't be significant if the model is specified correctly, which 
means the squared predictions should not have much explanatory power. That is, wouldn’t expect _hatsq to be a 
significant predictor if the model is specified correctly. So looking at the p-value for _hatsq, if p-value for hatsq 
is P<0.01, and shows it is significant and this show the model is not correctly specified (Verbeek, 2008). 
Thus, before  applying the binary logistic regression model, the  Hosmer-Lemeshow  test of goodness of fit  was  
used  to  see  the  overall  fitness  of  the  model.  Similarly, before estimating the model, various detection and 
diagnostic tests were done to check for the related econometric problems such as multicollinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, and model specification bias as discussed in chapter three. The  results  of  these  tests  
indicated  that  the  model  is  fitted,  no severe multicollinearity, and no heteroskedasticity problem. 
 
5.3. HYPOTHESIS AND DEFINITION OF VARIABLES FOR FACTORS AFFECTING                                        
GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT PERFORMANCE 
Based on the reviewed empirical literature, the explanatory variables selected for this study were broadly 
categorized under group characteristic related factors, economic and institutional factors. A brief explanation of 
the explanatory variables selected for this study and their likely influence on group loan repayment are presented 
below. 
5.3.1. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable for this logistic regression model is defined as loan repayment performance valued as 1 
and 0, 1 stands for a group paid all installments on until the survey took place, otherwise 0. 
5.3.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The independent variables used in this study were based on the reviewed empirical literature. The hypothesis 
formulated for the factors and their priori effects are explained below. 
A. GROUP CHARACTERISTIC RELATED FACTORS 
When  loan  is  not  repaid,  it  may  be  due  to  the  character  of  the  borrowers,  borrowers’ unwillingness  and  
/or  inability  to  repay.  Business experience, social ties, group size, peer monitoring and internal rules and 
regulation are considered in this study as group-characteristic related factors that affect group loan repayment. 
The factors and their effect are discussed below 
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE  
Business experience is defined as any business practice before. Sylvester et al.(2013) widely used business 
experience as a factor influencing group loan repayment i.e., with higher business experience stands a better 
chance of repaying more loan than with those of lower business experience because as borrowers get experience 
and know how to improve operating their business.  
H1: Business experience is predicted to have positive impact on loan repayment performance (EXP). 
SOCIAL TIES  
Social ties are any relationship like kinship and friendship among the borrowers. If social ties among members 
are sufficiently strong, the net effect is positive because by defaulting willfully a borrower incurs sanctions from 
both the lender and the community (Besley & Coate, 1995).  
H2: The existence of social ties among group members is anticipated to have positive impact on loan 
repayment performance (ST). 
GROUP SIZE 
Zeller (1996) noted that groups will have increasing costs of coordination, moral hazard, and free-rider problems 
when group size surpasses manageable levels. The optimal group size will vary with respect to socioeconomic 
and agro ecological conditions of the participating communities and with program characteristics. Thus, 
hypothesis of this study was loan repayment performance increases as the borrowers have business experience, 
social ties, and saving but decrease as group size increases.  
H3: The existence of small number in a group is expected to have positive relationship with loan   
repayment performance (GS). 
PEER MONITORING 
The existing theoretical models of peer monitoring assumes that the repayment performance in group-lending 
program is positively related to the homogeneity of projects with respect to the riskiness (Stiglitz, 1990).  
H4: The strong peer monitoring system practiced by group members, expected to bring good loan     
repayment performance (PM). 
 
INTERNAL RULES AND REGULATION 
As per empirical analysis on determinants of repayment performance in credit groups by Zeller (1998) 
implementation of internal rules and regulations by the group members would lead to the better  repayment  
performance  that  is  decrement  in  the  cost  of  operations  of  the  lender  and decrement in the default rate. 
H5: Internal  rule  and  regulation  is  predicted  to  have  a higher  probability  of  loan  repayment  (IRR). 
GROUP FORMATION (GF) 
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Screening is an important function of group formation, and several studies suggest the importance of practical 
measures in screening. Groups that directly screened members according to their local reputations, or that had 
adopted a written internal constitution, experienced significantly fewer problems with loan delinquency (Ghatak 
& Guinnane, 1999).  
H6: Groups that form by self-screened are predicted to have good loan repayment performance (GF). 
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Although there are different socio-economic factors that can affect group loan repayment, this study took the 
saving habit of borrowers to influence their repayment performance. 
SAVING SIZE 
Saving can also play a significant role in increasing levels of institutional sustainability and enhancing levels of 
outreach. Therefore, MFIs that offer saving facilities have a cheap source of funds for further lending to more 
sustainable operations (Murray & Boros, 2002).  
H7:  Groups who open an account and save are likely to have positive impact on loan repayment 
performance (SAV). 
C. INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Loan defaults arise not only from problems with the borrower but also because of the problems with the lender 
(microfinance institution). Many studies have found that lender characteristics play an important role in 
determining loan repayment of the group. These  factors can  be  loan size,  suitability  of  repayment  period,  
loan  supervision,  and  training. 
LOAN SIZE  
The small loan size is often advanced by the micro finance institutions as a way of minimizing risks.  However,  
when  the clients  are  not  given  adequate  funds  to cater  for  their business needs, they tend to   resort to 
multiple borrowing. This in turn affects their repayment and increases the risks of the loan (Natukunda, 2010).  
H8: The larger the loan size disbursed is predicted to have positive and higher probability of loan 
repayment performance (LS). 
LOAN TERM 
Woolcock (2008) observed that if the loan term (credit period) is too short, the borrower fails to generate 
revenue to  enable  him/her  make  repayments  while  a  longer  loan  term  may  make  the  client  extravagant  
and  the client  may  in  the  end  fail  to  pay  back. 
 H9: The longer the grace period is predicted to have positive and high loan repayment rate (LT).  
TRAINING  
Statham (2008) stated that one of the important requirements for the success of microfinance institutions is to 
create awareness to potential clients by giving appropriate training to borrowers about loan utilization, loan 
terms and obligations. 
H10: Training is predicted to play a positive and significant role on loan repayment performance (TR). 
SUPERVISION  
Retta (2000) has examined loan repayment performance of group borrowers in Addis Ababa. His finding was, 
supervision has found to encourage repayment and Jemal (2003) supported that supervision are positively and 
significantly related to loan repayment performance. 
H 11: As loan supervision is made regarding loan utilization, the probability of loan repayment by the 
 groups is higher (SUP). 
So, the complete mathematical function of the study is: 
Y (i) = α+β1EXP+ β2ST+ β3GS+ β4PM+ β5IRR+ β6GF+ β7SAV+ β8LS+ β9LT+ β10TR+ β11SUP+ µi ----
-(3) 
Where: Yi = repayment performance of loan (1 if the loan was fully repaid within the specified period of the 
loan contract, otherwise 0)  
α = Constant (intercept) 
µi = Disturbance error 
 β1, β2… β11 = Slope coefficients of independent variables (the unknown parameters that reflecting the 
impact of change in independent variables). 
 
6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents, analyzes and interprets the response and reactions gathered from the respondents through 
structured questionnaire and interview. For this purpose, qualitative data collected through interview were 
described and logit regression model was used to analyze the quantitative data collected through questionnaire. 
Moreover, this chapter presents the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on the binary dependant 
variable.  
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6.1. DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS  
In  this  section,  the  respondents’  demographic  characteristics  are  presented  with  particular reference to 
gender , age and education level in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Demographic Characterizes of Respondents 
Category Number Percent 
Gender: 
Male  
Female  
 
25 
25 
 
50 
50 
Total   50 100 
Age:  
18-25 
26-35 
36-45 
46+ 
 
15 
19 
8 
8 
 
30 
38 
16 
16 
Total 50 100 
Educational level: 
Secondary  
Diploma  
Degree  
 
9 
13 
28 
 
18 
26 
56 
Total  50 100 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
As indicated in Table 2 above, among the 50 respondents; 
 25(50 percent) of the respondents were female borrowers and 25(50 percent) respondents were male 
borrowers. 
 Respondents in the age category of 18-25, 26-35, 36-45 and 46+ accounts for 30 percent, 38 percent, 
16 percent and 16 percent, respectively.  
 Majority (56 percent) of the respondents have attended first degree followed by diploma holder (26 
percent). The remaining respondents (18 percent) had secondary school. 
 
6.2. RESULTS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
6.2.1. STATUS OF GROUP LOAN REPAYMENT  
To know the loan repayment status, group borrowers were asked whether they have paid  back fully  and on 
repayment with arrears  (i.e., 30, 60, 180, less than 360 days  past due),  or not paid successfully  (defaulted,  i.e.,  
greater  than  360  days  past  due)  in  the  form  of  “Yes”  or  “No” response question. Such an objective 
response and direct measurement of the binary dependent variable  (i.e.,  group  loan  repayment  equal  to  “1”  
if  groups  were  non-defaulters  and  “0” otherwise)  was used to determine the  factors that affect group  loan 
repayment performance  in similar studies of Paxton (1996) and Million et al.(2012). 
Out of  the  total  respondents 28 (56 percent) were  able  to  repay  the  loan  within  the given maturity period, 
and hence they are creditworthy. Whereas the remaining 22 (44 percent) respondents have defaulted (i.e., greater 
than 360 days past due) on their loan and this implies that the borrowers are not creditworthy.  
The following Figure 3 shows the status of loan repayment by the group borrowers.  
 
Default  problems  destroy  lending  capacity  as  the  flow of repayment declines, transforming lenders 
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into welfare  agencies,  instead  of a viable  financial  institution. Loan default may also deny new applicants 
access to credit because the micro finance institutions management problems augment in direct proportion to the 
increasing default problem (Hunte, 1996). Concerning this matter, annual reports of DECSI indicates that the 
loan default rate for DECSI is fluctuating from time to time as summarized in Figure 2 above, especially in the 
years of 2010 and 2013. This result also found 44 percent default rate. This implies that high loan default rate 
might threaten the financial sustainability of DECSI.  
6.2.2. LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULT, ANALYSIS, AND DISCUSSION 
Group loan repayment has been affected by numerous variables that were tested in many of the previous 
empirical evidences. Similarly, in this study, the selection and incorporation of the explanatory variables was 
guided by the conceptual framework discussed in the literature review (Figure 1).  Due consideration was given 
in including variables that are possibly determine group loan repayment performance and tested in this study. 
The binary logistic regression was used to identify the determinant factors and to estimate their potential effect 
of each explanatory variable on the loan repayment rate of group borrowers. The explanatory variables include 
group characteristic related factors, economic and institutional factors. 
Before  applying the binary logistic regression model, the  Hosmer-Lemeshow  test of goodness of fit  
was  used  to  see  the  overall  fitness  of  the  model.  Similarly, before estimating the model, various detection 
and diagnostic tests were done to check for the related econometric problems such as multicollinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, and model specification bias as discussed in chapter three. The  results  of  these  tests  
indicated  that  the  model  is  fitted,  no severe multicollinearity, and no heteroskedasticity problem. 
Table 3 below  presents  the  binary  logistic  regression  results,  i.e.,  shows  the  odd  ratios 
(probability of loan non-default/probability of loan default), the p-value, and the marginal effect of explanatory 
variables included in the model. 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Estimation Result 
Variables Odds ratios p>|z| Marginal effects (dy/dx) 
Group characteristic related 
factors       
Group size     
Social ties 
Business experience 
Peer monitoring 
Group formation (screening)  
Internal rule and regulation   
Economic factor 
Saving  
Institutional Factors       
Loan term 
Loan size   
Training   
Supervision 
 
 2.52673 
0.0028087 
8.308234 
4.474295 
23.88643 
  0.1756475 
 
16.51643 
 
73.72195 
  0.1500182 
 5.241702 
 41.87587 
 
0.461 
0.025** 
0.025** 
0.271 
0.020** 
0.098*** 
 
0.027** 
 
0.000* 
0.375 
0.139 
0.021** 
 
0.2118738 
-0.8286518 
0.4694825 
0.322647 
0.6273108 
-0.4008809 
 
0.5497403 
 
0.7904858 
-0.4301928 
0.3810333 
0.7251103 
Statistics: 
Number of observations   = 50                                                                   Prob > chi
2   
= 0.0033 
Wald chi
2
(9)                        = 27.91                                                           Pseudo R
2
   = 0.6801           
*, **, *** Level of significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. 
Source: Own Computation (2014) 
 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING  
The  interpretation  of  estimation  results  (i.e.,  logistic  regression  output)  of  the  explanatory variables are 
presented bellow followed by tests of research hypotheses. 
According to the Table 3 above, the most influential explanatory variables from group characteristic 
related factors in determining group loan repayment performance are social ties, business experience, group 
formation, and internal rules and regulation with significant estimated odds ratio value of 0.0028 (P-value of 
0.025); 8.31 (P-value of  0.025), 23.89 (P-value of 0.02), and 0.18 (p-value of 0.098), respectively; saving, the 
only economic factor, is one of the influential factor with the odd ratio value of 16.52 (P-value of 0.027). From 
institutional factors, suitability of loan repayment period (loan term) and supervision are found significant in 
influencing dependant variable (loan repayment) with an odds ratio value of 73.72 (P-value of 0.000) and 41.88 
(P-value of 0.021), respectively.   
H2: The existence of social ties among group members is anticipated to have positive impact on loan 
repayment performance. 
Table  3 above  shows  that  the  first  group  characteristic variable  found  significant  in  this study  is 
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social ties. The result  indicates  that  the  social ties  has  a negative effect on the probability of group loan 
repayment. Similarly, the odd ratio shows that the probability of loan repayment decreases by 0.0028 times for 
group borrower that have social ties as compared to group borrowers who have not social ties, other things kept 
constant. The marginal effect of this variable is -0.829 indicating that the probability of group loan repayment for 
group borrower with social ties decreases by 82.87 percent as compared to group borrowers who did not have 
social ties.  
This may be due to the social ties or relationship; there may not be tight control and enforcement at the 
time of loss. Hence, the research hypothesis which says “the existence of social ties among group members is 
anticipated to have positive impact on loan repayment performance.” is rejected at 5 percent level of significance, 
i.e., the alternative hypothesis (the existence of social ties among group members have negative impact on loan 
repayment performance) may be accepted.  
The result is inconsistent with the empirical studies of Besley and Coate (1995) who found that if 
social ties among members are sufficiently strong, the net effect is positive because by defaulting willfully a 
borrower incurs sanctions from both the lender and the community. With sufficient social capital, a borrowing 
group enforces repayment better than would take place with individual liability. Godquin (2004) also stated that 
social ties and professional training of the borrower have expected positive impact on the repayment 
performance. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the probability of group loan repayment decreases as group borrowers 
have a social ties because of weak enforcement at the time of default. 
 
H3: Business experience is predicted to have positive impact on loan repayment performance. 
The other group characteristic variable found significant at 5 percent is business experience (Table 3). In line 
with the expectation, holding other factors constant, business experience has more likelihood of loan repayment. 
The result shows an odd ratio value of 8.31. This indicates that the probability of group loan repayment is 8.31 
times higher for group borrowers who have business experience than those who have not. The marginal effect of 
this variable is 0.47 indicating that the probability of group loan repayment for borrowers with business 
experiences increases by 47 as compared to group borrowers with no business experience. 
The reason why group borrowers having business experiences pay their loan in time higher than those 
who have not may be attributed to improvement in managerial skill which makes for higher profitability which 
in turn induces the need for more financial resources to further enhance profitability. This motivates the group 
borrowers to settle their loan and access for future credit. Therefore, the research hypothesis which says 
“business experience is predicted to have positive impact on loan repayment performance” is accepted at 5 
percent level of significance.  
Besides, this result is consistent with the finding of Fikirte (2011) and Zelalem et al.(2013) which 
stated that business experience was found to significantly influence the probability of being non-defaulter. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that business experience has statistically significant positive association 
with loan repayment performance. 
 
H5: Groups that form by self-screened are predicted to have good loan repayment performance. 
Group formation refers to the way in which group members formed to engage in their current business activity. It 
is hypothesized that screening and selecting of creditworthy borrowers is more effective with groups that are 
formed by the members themselves than the groups that depend on the intervention from an outside agent to be 
formed. Their loan default is lower for groups that are formed on their own.  
The odd ratio of 23.89 for group formation indicates that the probability of loan repayment increases 
by 23.89 times higher for group borrowers who are self-screened than group borrowers who are screened by an 
outside agent or promoter. Similarly, the marginal effect of 0.6273 shows, other things remain constant, the 
probability of loan repayment increases by 62.73 percent for those groups who are initiated by the members 
themselves as compared to those groups who are initiated by outside agent or promoter.  
In line with this expectation, the variable group formation has a positive relation with loan repayment 
and is statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. The possible reason as to why the groups 
initiated by the members themselves have performed better in repaying the loan is that the group members can 
obtain low cost information regarding the reputation, indebtedness and effort of a group member to ensure the 
repayment of the loan. The group members might be able to access complex and sensitive information about the 
group member. Hence, the hypothesis “groups that forms by self-screened are predicted to have good loan 
repayment performance” is accepted at 5 percent significance level. 
The result is consistent with the theoretical models of peer monitoring assumes that the repayment performance 
in group-lending program is positively related to the riskiness of their projects (Stiglitz, 1990) and Ghatak and 
Guinnane (1999) suggested that group formation will display positive corresponding under a joint-liability 
contract. Screening is an important function of group formation, and several studies suggested the importance of 
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practical measures in screening. Groups that directly screened members according to their local reputations, or 
that had adopted a written internal constitution, experienced significantly fewer problems with loan delinquency 
(Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999).  
Generally, from this result, it can be concluded that the probability of group loan repayment 
performance increases as far as group formation is based on members’ self-selection because group members can 
easily identify the creditworthy group member. 
 
H6: Groups which have internal rule and regulation are predicted to have a higher Probability of 
 loan repayment. 
Table 3 indicated that the fourth group characteristic variable found significant in this study is internal rule and 
regulation. The result indicates that the internal rule and regulation has a negative effect on the probability of 
group loan repayment. The odd ratio shows that the probability of loan repayment decreases by 0.18 times for 
group borrower that have internal rule and regulation compared to group borrowers who have not internal rule 
and regulation, other things kept constant. The marginal effect of this variable is -0.4009 indicating that the 
probability of group loan repayment for group borrower with internal rule and regulation decreases by 40.09 
percent as compared to group borrowers who did not have s internal rule and regulation.  
Respondents were asked whether their business is successful or not. From 35 which have no internal 
rule and regulation, 20(57 percent) were successful while 15(43 percent) were not successful in their business. 
From 15 respondents which have rules and regulation, 8(53 percent) are not successful but only 7(47 percent) 
were successful in their business. 
Respondents also asked their expectation about the contribution of internal rules and regulation. So, 
among 50 respondents, 34(68 percent) replied that internal rules and regulation has no contribution and 16(32 
percent) responded that internal rues and regulation has a contribution on loan repayment performance. 
Therefore, an internal rules and regulation alone may not have contribution on loan repayment performance 
unless it is enforced.  
Hence, the research hypothesis which says “Groups which have internal rule and regulation are 
predicted to have a higher probability of loan repayment” is rejected at 10 percent level of significance.  
The result contradicts with the empirical findings of Zeller (1998) which stated that implementation of 
internal rules and regulations by the group members would lead to the better repayment performance that is 
decrement in the cost of operations of the lender and decrement in the default rate. 
From this result, it can be concluded that as group borrowers who launch internal rules and regulation 
may not have probability of loan repayment performance as compared to those who have not internal rules and 
regulation. It determines the nature of the business they operate and its profitability.  
 
H7: Groups who save are likely to have positive impact on loan repayment performance. 
The logistic regression results indicated in the Table 3 above reveals that saving has a positive relation with loan 
repayment. The odd ratio shows that the probability of loan repayment is 16.52 times higher for groups who save 
in incitement of repayment than groups which do not save. The marginal effect of 0.55 implies, holding other 
variables constant, the probability of repaying the loan increases by 55 percent for those group borrowers who 
exercise saving on defaulting members as compared to those borrowers who do not exercise saving on defaulting 
members to enforce loan repayment. 
As a result, the hypothesis which states “groups who open an account and save are likely to have 
positive impact on loan repayment performance” is accepted at 5 percent significance level.  
The finding is similar with the findings of Zeller (1996) which declared that delivering saving service 
programs to their members result in a significantly higher repayment rate. This result emphasizes the role of 
saving services for improving the performance of group credit programs.  
Therefore, it is possible to say that saving proves to be positive and meaningfully contribute to 
improve the group loan repayment performance. 
 
H8: The longer the grace period is predicted to have positive and high loan repayment rate.  
The Table 3 result indicates that the loan term has a positive effect on the probability of group loan repayment. 
The odd ratio shows that the probability of loan repayment increases by 73.72 times higher for group borrower 
that perceived the loan term is enough as compared to group borrowers who did not satisfied with the loan term 
given, other things kept constant. The marginal effect of this variable is 0.79 indicating that the probability of 
group loan repayment for group borrowers that perceived the loan term is enough increases by 49 percent  as  
compared  to  group  borrowers  who  did  not  satisfied  with  the loan term given.  
Hence, the research hypothesis which says “the longer the grace period is predicted to have positive 
and high loan repayment rate” is accepted at 1 percent level of significance.  
The result is consistent with the empirical studies of Woolcock (2008) which stated that if the loan 
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term is too short, the borrower fails to generate revenue to enable them make repayments while a longer loan 
term may make the client extravagant and the client may in the end fail to pay back. For successful results, the 
loan terms should match the cash patterns to help the client budget cash flows. George (2008) also supported that 
a large majority of the micro finance institutions were offering very short loan repayment periods without grace 
periods, thus, straining and pressuring them to make quick repayments. The clients did not feel the immediate 
impact of the loan but instead they felt immense pressure to put all their earnings towards loan repayment. 
To sum up, the logistic regression result shows that as the loan term (grace period) increases, the 
probability of loan repayment performance highly increases because long period of time to pay helps borrowers 
to generate cash and pay their obligation on time.   
 
H11: As loan supervision is made regarding loan utilization, the probability of loan repayment by the 
 groups is higher. 
Table 3 above shows that supervision has positive impact on the probability of loan repayment. The odd ratio of 
41.88 for supervision indicates the probability of loan repayment increases by 41.88 times higher for group 
borrower who were supervised as compared to group borrowers who did not supervised. Likewise, the marginal 
effect of 0.725 shows that, keeping other factors constant, the probability of group loan repayment increases by 
72.5 percent for group borrowers who were supervised as compared to those who didn’t supervised.  
Therefore, the research hypothesis which says “as loan supervision is made regarding loan utilization, the 
probability of loan repayment by the groups is higher” is accepted at 5 percent level of significance.  
The result is consistent with the previous empirical evidence of Retta (2000) which stated that 
supervision is found to encourage repayment hence reduce the probability of loan default. Besides, Jemal (2003) 
has reported supervision is positively and significantly related to loan repayment performance. 
From this result, it is possible to summate that continuous follow up to group borrowers have positive 
impact and meaningfully contribute to improve the group loan repayment performance. 
To summarize the regression result, business experience, screening, saving, loan term and supervision 
have a positive and significant effect on loan repayment performance while social ties, and internal rules and 
regulation have a negative and significant effect on the loan repayment. But, the other variables like group size, 
peer monitoring, loan size and training have no statistically significant impact on loan repayment performance. 
 
7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
7.1. CONCLUSIONS 
The study was carried out to identify and analyze the factors that influence group loan repayment, particularly 
those groups functioning in MSEs Service sector and who are beneficiaries of DECSI microfinance, Mekelle 
branch. All of the eleven explanatory variables were analyzed by using the binary logit regression model. 
Therefore, based on the research findings, the following conclusions are drawn. 
The status of group loan repayment revealed that about 56 percent of group borrowers were non 
defaulters and about 44 percent of them were defaulters. This result shows that there is high default rate which in 
turn adversely affect the financial liquidity and sustainability of the DECSI.  
The binary logit regression model revealed that among the eleven (11) explanatory variables which 
were hypothesized to influence group loan repayment, seven (7) variables were found to be statistically 
significant at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels of significance. These variables are business experience, 
group formation (self-screening), saving, loan term and supervision had positive and significant effect on group 
loan repayment performance, while social ties and internal rules and regulation had negative and significant 
effects. The remaining four variables (i.e., group size, peer monitoring, loan size and training) were found to be 
statistically insignificant in affecting group loan repayment performance. 
The marginal effect of business experience and group formation (self-screening) on loan repayment 
performance shows 0.47 and 0.63, respectively. This indicates that the probability of group loan repayment 
increases by 47 percent when the group has relatively more experience and by 62.73 percent for those groups 
who are initiated by the members themselves, other factors remaining constant. 
Saving is found to have positive and significant effect on loan repayment performance with marginal 
effect of 0.55 showing that, keeping other factors constant, the probability of group loan repayment increases by 
55 percent for those who save than those who did not save and saving builds the equity of poor households and 
protects them against unforeseen economic and personal crisis and also offset interest rates.  
Suitable loan repayment period (loan term) and supervision are the variables found statistically 
significant and have positive impact on group loan repayment performance with the marginal effect of 0.79 and 
0.725, respectively. This shows that, keeping other factors constant, the probability of group loan repayment 
increases by 79 percent for group borrowers that found suitable loan repayment period as compared to those who 
didn’t found suitable repayment period and 72.5 percent for those who are supervised on regular basis.  
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Whereas social ties, and internal rules and regulations were found to have negative and statistically significant 
influence on loan repayment performance with the marginal effect of -0.8287 and 0.401, respectively. This 
indicates that the probability of group loan repayment for group borrower that has social ties decreases by 82.47 
percent as compared to group borrowers who did not have social ties and the probability of group loan 
repayment performance decreases by 40.1 percent for groups which have internal rules and regulation as 
compared to group borrowers who did not have internal rules and regulation. 
 
7.2. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on conclusion of research findings, the following recommendations are forwarded: 
 As per the discussion held with the loan officer and coordinators of DECSI, one reason for low loan 
repayment by MSEs is that same loan term for all sectors and does not consider the nature of business. 
Sectors return or productive period may differ. So DECSI should set the loan term accordingly. 
 Another reason for low repayment is borrowers are exposed to loss because of their project infeasibility 
and fail to generate income to pay back their loan. Lack of continuous and relevant training is also the 
reason for low repayment mentioned by officers. Of course there is induction training but it has no 
continuity. Then lack of continuous training has its own share why borrowers fail to pay their obligation. 
Therefore, DECSI should focus mainly on the feasibility of the project and reset the loan term based on 
the nature of the business/sector and create awareness related to business and how to use loan to clients 
before disbursing loan through continuous and short training. These help borrowers to be aware about 
loan and becoming productive and viable to pay their loan. This enables DECSI to exist in a sustainable 
manner and reach millions of poor people in the region thereby eradicating poverty. 
 The screening and selection criterion in place should be revised and DECSI should have to play major 
role directly in screening and selection of applicants according to borrowers’ interest that is borrowers 
can screen honor partner if they form themselves because they know one another. This could reduce 
significantly loan default and make DECSI is sustainable because creditworthy borrower can be 
selected from the very beginning. 
 Suitable loan repayment period (loan term) was found to have positive significant impact on loan 
repayment performance. Therefore, DECSI should consider and set the repayment period based on the 
nature of the sector and expected optimal time that the sector will start generating income (grace period) 
and set the loan term. Thus, the borrowers will become successful and sustainable which in turn make 
DECSI financially sustainable.  
 Supervision has a positive and significant impact on loan repayment performance. The logistic 
regression revealed that those who supervised showed good performance of loan repayment. Thus, 
DECSI should make continuous follow up and guidance to borrowers on how to use loan in general and 
pay regular visits to evaluate the loan utilization and repayment, this makes borrowers to discharge their 
obligation and improve the proper utilization of the loan there by improving repayment performance. 
Besides, DECSI’s continuous supervision may bridge the lack of borrowers’ business experience. 
Supervision also may source information and avoid the adverse selection and moral hazard which is the 
most important problems in the functioning of credit market which arises from imperfect information. 
 Social ties has a negative effect on the probability of group loan repayment because the group may fail 
to put pressure on the defaulting members in order not to adversely affect their social relationship. Thus, 
DECSI should strive to build and promote an entrepreneurial attitude among the group borrowers 
through training and experience sharing. 
 Business experience has a positive and significant contribution on loan repayment performance. 
Relatively more business experience among other important factors enhance loan repayment because 
experienced borrowers know how to allocate their loan to productive business area and settle their loan 
effectively and clients with higher business experience stands a better chance of repaying loan than with 
those of lower business experience. The reason for this may be attributed to improvement in managerial 
skill which makes for higher profitability which in turn induces the need for more financial resources to 
further enhance profitability. However, considering business experience in DECSI’s loan repayment 
may not be practical because its borrowers are mainly beginners who are willing to engage in self 
employment. Therefore, DECSI must consider relevant and continuous supervision in order to 
compensate the gap in business experience.  
 Saving has a positive and significant impact on loan repayment performance. So, DECSI should 
enhance the existing saving services to borrowers so as to pay their loan on time. Saving can play a 
significant role in increasing level of institutional sustainability and enhancing level of outreach. MFIs 
that offer saving facilitation have a cheap source of funds for further lending to more sustainable 
operations. In addition, saving builds the equity of borrowers and protects them against unforeseen 
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economic and personal crisis. Thus, saving services improve the repayment rate of the group, increase 
the financial discipline of group borrowers, and can also serve as loan collateral.  
 Internal rule and regulation  has  a  negative  effect  on  the  probability  of  group  loan repayment. 
Therefore, having an internal rules and regulation alone may not have contribution on loan repayment 
performance unless it is enforced. So, DECSI should verify whether internal rules and regulations are in 
practice. 
 
7.3. LIMITATION AND SUGGESTION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
These study findings may not be used to generalize about the determinants of the MSEs group loan repayment 
performance because the study has focused on only the MSEs service sector and confined only to the Mekelle 
city.  The  study  has  only  throw  a  light  on the  factors that  determine  group  loan repayment  performance.  
Thus, comprehensive and comparative studies are recommended in order to have holistic picture on the MSEs 
group loan repayment performance by considering wide area and all the sectors such as construction, urban 
agriculture, and manufacturing, and trade. 
Within the service sector, there are many factors which are not considered in this study. Factors include group 
harmony, initial capital, loan frequency, interest rate, access to working premises, and infrastructure. Hence, 
more fruitful finding may be reached by taking the above mentioned factors in to consideration.   
Moreover, this study has employed chi-square test to test the association among the dependent and independent 
variables. Thus, further research may be conducted by considering optional statistical tools such as mean 
difference test (t-tests), correlation, and regression models.  
 
7.4. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
MFIs have immense contribution towards poverty reduction by creating employment opportunity especially in 
developing courtiers like Ethiopia. One of the key factors for profitability and sustainability of MFI is good loan 
repayment performance rate. Analyzing this loan repayment performance and setting appropriate solutions is 
essential to expand the activities of MFI in a sustainable manner.  
Thus, the study provides information for a better understanding on the determinants of loan repayment 
performance of DECSI and the primary advantage of this study is to establish a knowledge base that enables to 
makes a sound decision and take corrective action. In addition, the study will be useful for policy makers, other 
lending institutions and Stakeholders. Specially, the study benefits; 
 MFIs to have a clue about the association and effect of each explanatory factor on loan repayment 
performance. 
 Borrowers may get awareness on how to use and allocate loan in productive investment, i.e., it supports 
borrowers to be viable and feasible in their investment and pay their obligation. 
  MFIs will exist financially sound. 
 Finally, this study will have a contribution to academicians or researchers who will conduct their 
studies on similar areas. 
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